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Introduction 
On July 27, 2006, President Bush signed into law a twenty-five-year extension 
of the expiring provisions of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).1 Among the provi-
sions reauthorized is the preclearance process, a procedure that constitutes the 
VRA’s most remarkable and notorious requirement. Included in Section 5 of the 
original 1965 statute, preclearance reverses the presumption of validity that 
typically attaches to state and local legislative and administrative action. It man-
dates that “covered” jurisdictions—defined as those that used a voting “test or 
device” and had extremely low levels of voter registration or turnout measured 
as of various dates beginning in 1964—obtain approval from federal officials 
before implementing any changes in their voting laws and procedures.2  
                                                                 
Ellen Katz is Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to 
Jenna Bednar, Chandler Davidson, Daniel Halberstam, Rick Hasen, Don Herzog, J. J. 
Prescott, and Scott Shapiro for helpful comments, Charles Doriean and Ryan Nunn for 
statistical work, and Anna Baldwin and Emma Cheuse for excellent research assistance 
and for their sustained contributions to the VRI. Thanks also to the Chief Justice Earl 
Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity at Boalt Hall School of Law and the 
University of Michigan Law School, which provided generous financial support for this 
project. 
1 See Hamil R. Harris and Michael Abramowitz, Bush Signs Voting Rights Act Ex-
tension, WASH. POST, July 28, 2006.  
2 As originally enacted, Section 5 mandates that “covered” jurisdictions demonstrate 
that a proposed change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect” of deny-
ing or abridging the right to vote based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). As reautho-
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Few would dispute that preclearance has been largely responsible for the 
VRA’s remarkable efficacy in eliminating deep-rooted racial barriers to political 
participation in covered jurisdictions.3 What is contested is whether this require-
ment remains justified.4 Discrimination in voting persists, but is it sufficiently dire 
to warrant retention of Section 5’s burden shifting regime? Is, moreover, the dis-
crimination that persists in covered jurisdictions sufficiently different from the 
discriminatory practices voters confront in other parts of the country to justify 
keeping only the previously covered jurisdictions subject to the strictures of pre-
clearance?5 
It is widely assumed that the reauthorization of Section 5 will survive consti-
tutional scrutiny only if the record Congress amassed to support the statute docu-
ments pervasive unconstitutional conduct in covered jurisdictions for which pre-
clearance offers a remedy.6 This chapter takes issue with this assumption. It argues 
                                                                                                                                                
rized, Section 5 requires that the change “neither has the purpose nor will have the ef-
fect.” 
3 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its 
Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1712–14 (2004) (arguing data shows that “[n]o 
longer are blacks political outsiders in the covered jurisdictions”); Chandler Davidson  
and Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction, in QUIET 
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965–1990, at 381 
(C. Davidson and B. Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION]; NAT’L 
COMM’N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER 
LAW, PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT WORK 1982–2005, at 
37, 40–49 (Chandler Davidson ed., Feb. 2006). 
4 For examples of those arguing it is not, see, for example, EDWARD BLUM AND LAU-
REN CAMPBELL, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, AS-
SESSMENT OF VOTING RIGHTS PROGRESS IN JURISDICTIONS COVERED UNDER SECTION FIVE 
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 2-3 (May 17, 2006), at http://www.aei.org/publications/ 
pubID.  24405,filter.all/pub_detail.asp (arguing that the AEI Bullock-Gaddie voting stud-
ies have found “no crisis in minority voting rights in 2006” and “no quantifiable differ-
ence” between covered and noncovered jurisdictions justifying the Act’s renewal); A Bill 
to Reauthorize and Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Part I): Hearing on H.R. 9 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Const. Regarding the Reauthori-
zation of the Voting Rights Act, 109th Cong. (May 4, 2006) [hereinafter House Reau-
thorization Hearings] (statement of Roger Clegg, President, Center for Equal Opportu-
nity, at 6–7); An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and 
Legal Issues Relating to Reauthorization, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. (May 9, 2006) [hereinafter Senate Reauthorization Hearings] (statement of 
Samuel Issacharoff, Professor, NYU School of Law, at 1) (arguing that “it is far from 
clear that the injustices that justified Section 5 in 1965 can justify its unqualified reen-
actment today”); id. (May 17, 2006) (statement of Abigail Thernstrom, senior fellow, 
Manhattan Institute). 
5 See, e.g., House Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Roger 
Clegg, president, Center for Equal Opportunity, at 6–7) (criticizing the record prepared 
by Congress partly for its failure to compare covered and noncovered jurisdictions). 
6 See id. (statement of J. Gerald Hebert, former attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Civil Rights Division, at 3) (affirming the record created as sufficient to satisfy City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)); id. (statement of Debo Adegbile, Associate Di-
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that recent Supreme Court precedent requiring such a record for new congres-
sional legislation enforcing civil rights ought not apply when Congress renews an 
existing, operational statute such as Section 5. In this context, the record must 
make the case for the continuing need for preclearance, as opposed to the need for 
this legislation in the first instance. A record of pervasive unconstitutional conduct 
should not be expected since the legislation at issue was put in place to remedy 
precisely such conduct. Indeed, to require such a record would mean that only 
ineffective statutes are entitled to reauthorization.7 
The continuing need for existing legislation like Section 5 requires not docu-
mentation of existing unconstitutional conduct but instead speculation about the 
scope of such conduct absent the preclearance requirement. To be sure, the quality 
of political participation in covered jurisdictions operating without the constraints 
imposed by Section 5 can hardly be predicted with certainty.8 Nevertheless, an 
important source of information regarding the operation of the statute and the con-
tinued need for it is found in judicial decisions construing Section 2, the VRA’s 
core permanent provision.  
As amended in 1982, Section 2 of the VRA proscribes electoral practices that 
result in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on race, color, or mem-
bership in a particular language-minority group.9 While Section 2 differs from 
Section 5 in significant ways,10 Section 2 litigation illuminates the Section 5 de-
                                                                                                                                                
rector of Litigation, NAACP-LDEF, at 16) (calling the record compiled by Congress a 
“strong” one); see also Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of 
Richard Hasen, professor, Loyola Law School) (arguing that the record provided may not 
be enough to reauthorize under City of Boerne in the form of proposed bill H.R. 9); id. 
(statement of Laughlin McDonald, director, ACLU Voting Rights Project) (calling the 
record provided by Congress sufficient to meet the Boerne standard). But see id. (state-
ment of Pamela S. Karlan, professor of public interest law, Stanford University School of 
Law, at 15). 
7 For development of this idea and an evaluation of alternate standards that might 
apply, see Ellen D. Katz, Judicial Review and the Voting Rights Act (working draft on file 
with author); see also Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 4 (May 16, 2006) 
(statement of Pamela S. Karlan, professor of public interest law, Stanford University 
School of Law, at 15) (“The question whether Congress can continue coverage of the 
already covered jurisdictions . . . does not require that Congress conclude that if it were 
writing on a completely clean slate today, it would choose the original triggering formu-
las. Rather, it depends on whether continuing to subject the covered jurisdictions to the 
preclearance regime is congruent and proportional to preventing future constitutional 
injury.”). 
8 Cf. Richard Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of 
the Voting Rights Act after Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L. J. 177, 179 (2005) (“The 
question of how much racial discrimination in voting practices there would be today if we 
suddenly eliminated preclearance is almost too speculative to answer.”). 
9 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000). 
10 Unlike Section 5, Section 2 applies nationwide and importantly presumes state ac-
tion to be valid absent proof establishing a statutory violation. Section 2 prohibits some 
conduct that might pass muster under Section 5 and permits various practices for which 
preclearance would be denied. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (districting 
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bate in important respects. Most notably, the very complexity of the Section 2 
inquiry renders judicial opinions addressing these claims a rich source of valuable 
information detailing political participation in the defendant jurisdictions.  
Under Section 2, an electoral practice results in a denial or abridgment of the 
right to vote if, based on the “totality of circumstances,” minority voters have “less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice.”11 Addressing the “totality of 
circumstances,” in turn, includes consideration of nine factors listed in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee Report that accompanied the 1982 amendments to Section 2. 
These so-called Senate Factors include: the existence of racial polarization in vot-
ing, a dearth of successful candidates from the minority group, racial appeals in 
campaigns, unresponsive elected officials, and a long history of official discrimi-
nation in virtually every realm of public life.12 
For nearly a quarter century, federal judges nationwide have been evaluating 
these factors when adjudicating claims under Section 2. They have produced 763 
published opinions involving 331 lawsuits in which they make thousands of fac-
tual findings.13 A systematic analysis of these findings yields a complex portrait of 
political participation in the jurisdictions involved, one that reveals many similari-
                                                                                                                                                
plan’s apparent compliance with Section 2 does not establish preclearance is warranted 
under Section 5); Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 520 U.S. 471 (1997) (Bossier 
Parish I) (apparent violation of Section 2 not grounds to deny preclearance under Section 
5). 
11 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000). 
12 S. REP. NO. 97–417, at 27–30 (1982) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT] (listing nine 
factors to measure the “totality of circumstances” under Section 2). 
13 See Ellen D. Katz with M. Aisenbrey, A. Baldwin, E. Cheuse, and A. Weisbrodt, 
Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act Since 1982, Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, 39 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 643, 654 (2006) [hereinafter “Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination”]; see 
also 2006 VRI Database Master List, available at http://www.votingreport.org (instruc-
tions on how to search and sort data are located within the Master List) [hereinafter “VRI 
Database Master List”]. 
Of all Section 2 litigation, 331 lawsuits produced at least one published or reported 
opinion considering a Section 2 claim between the passage of the 1982 amendment and 
December 31, 2005. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra, at 650–54 (de-
scribing research objectives and project design). The 331 lawsuits include some lawsuits 
that have not yet resulted in a final, unappealable decision, but for which at least one 
opinion was published within the specified time period. See, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, 2004 
WL 1335921 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), remanded by Hayden v. Pataki, 2006 WL 1493837 (2d 
Cir. Jun 01, 2006). The findings noted in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in LULAC 
v. Perry are included because this case produced published opinions before 2006. See 126 
S. Ct. 2594 (2006). This study does not include lawsuits that did not produce a published 
opinion before 2006. Examples of such lawsuits include Cottier v. City of Martin, 445 
F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 2006); Gonzalez v. City of Aurora, 2006 WL 681048 (N.D. Ill. 2006); 
Quinn v. Pauley, 2006 WL 752965 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
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ties between covered and noncovered jurisdictions, as well as a number of signifi-
cant differences.14  
This chapter proceeds in three parts. Part I offers an overview of the judicial 
findings in published Section 2 decisions, focusing in particular on how these find-
ings differ between covered and noncovered jurisdictions. Briefly stated, more 
courts in covered jurisdictions reached outcomes favorable to plaintiffs, and did so 
in a greater proportion of the lawsuits they decided, than did courts in noncovered 
jurisdictions, a difference that is statistically significant at the 90% level. More 
plaintiffs successfully challenged local electoral practices and did so in a greater 
proportion of the successful lawsuits in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered 
ones, a difference that is also statistically significant at the 90% level. Successful 
plaintiff challenges to local practices in both covered and noncovered jurisdictions 
exceeded the number of such challenges to statewide ones.15  
Courts in covered jurisdictions have both found and been more likely to find 
at levels that are statistically significant: acts of official discrimination that com-
promise voting rights, the use of devices that “enhance[ ]”16 opportunities for dis-
crimination against minority voters, and a lack of success by minority candidates. 
Courts in covered jurisdictions have also found and been more likely to find a 
lower level of minority voter registration and turnout, contemporary voting oppor-
tunities shaped by the continuing effects of discrimination in various socio-
economic realms, racial appeals in campaigns, and tenuous justifications underly-
ing challenged practices, although these differences between covered and noncov-
ered jurisdictions are not statistically significant.  
In roughly equal numbers and proportions, courts in covered and noncovered 
jurisdictions have found racially exclusive slating processes and nonresponsive 
elected officials. Courts in both types of jurisdictions also found legally significant 
racial bloc voting in a roughly equal number of lawsuits, but courts in covered 
                                                                 
14 To be sure, this portrait is necessarily incomplete. The study underlying this paper 
tracks only Section 2 lawsuits that produced an opinion that was published on Westlaw or 
LexisNexis. It does not consider unpublished opinions, claims that settled without a pub-
lished judicial opinion, or claims that plaintiffs otherwise failed to pursue after filing. As 
important, the survey does not (and indeed could not) consider jurisdictions in which 
Section 2 cases were not filed. Whether due to the prevalence of nondiscriminatory prac-
tices or a lack of resources to challenge discriminatory ones, the absence of such claims 
means that courts never examined opportunities for political participation in these juris-
dictions and never produced the findings that a Section 2 inquiry would yield. As a con-
sequence, the published Section 2 decisions do not offer an all-inclusive depiction of 
political participation and voting discrimination nationwide, but instead may be best un-
derstood as offering selective snapshots of political participation within the jurisdictions 
involved. These snapshots are themselves valuable for the rich detail they convey and for 
the more generalized, albeit necessarily qualified conclusions that may be extrapolated 
from them. 
15 See infra notes 22–23 and accompanying text; see also Appendix, Tables 8.1 and 
8.3; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13. 
16 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30. 
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jurisdictions documented voting patterns that were more extremely polarized by 
race at a rate that is statistically significant.  
Part II assesses the significance of these differences. It observes that the Sec-
tion 2 findings do not establish the sort of record of recent unconstitutional con-
duct that the Supreme Court has required in cases involving new congressional 
legislation. It argues, however, that renewal of an operational statute such as Sec-
tion 5 demands not a record of unconstitutional conduct, but instead a record that 
suggests the scope of such conduct in the absence of the statute. Part II then con-
siders changes the Section 2 findings suggest might occur in covered jurisdictions 
absent Section 5. It argues that these findings both suggest that past discrimination 
in covered jurisdictions has yet to be fully remedied and portend future discrimina-
tion absent the deterrent effect of preclearance. Finally, Part III presents the chap-
ter’s conclusions. 
I. Section 2 Claims in Covered and Noncovered Jurisdictions 
Several courts adjudicating Section 2 claims in noncovered regions go out of 
their way to distinguish the jurisdictions involved from those subject to Section 
5’s preclearance requirement. A First Circuit panel, for example, stated that 
“Boston’s history of discrimination in the area of voting rights was less egre-
gious than in certain other parts of the country.”17 A district court in New York 
similarly stated that “[no]thing in the history of New York [state] even remotely 
approaches the systematic exclusion of blacks from the political process that 
existed in the South.”18 
Differences certainly abound, but so do similarities. Judicial findings in Sec-
tion 2 cases reveal a complex and nuanced view of the relative opportunities for 
minority political participation in covered and noncovered jurisdictions—one that 
suggests that distinct problems persist in covered jurisdictions.  
A. The Cases 
Three hundred and thirty-one lawsuits addressed Section 2 claims between 
1982 and December 2005. Although eleven more lawsuits originated in noncov-
ered jurisdictions than in covered ones, more plaintiffs prevailed overall and in a 
                                                                 
17 Latino Political Action Comm., Inc. v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 409, 412 (1st Cir. 
1986). 
18 Reed v. Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843, 886 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Abi-
gail Thernstrom, Thernstrom Report, Def.Exh.R., at 11) (citing Nathan Glazer and Reed 
Ueda, Policy Against Prejudice and Discrimination, in HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 852–54 (Stephan Thernstrom ed., Harvard University Press 
1980)); see also Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1147, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 
1983); Rybicki, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1110–12 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
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greater proportion of the cases decided in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered 
ones, a difference that is statistically significant at the 90% level.19  
Plaintiffs in sixty-eight lawsuits met the three “preconditions” to a Section 2 
claim that the Supreme Court articulated in its 1986 decision Thornburg v. 
Gingles.20 More courts found the Gingles preconditions in noncovered jurisdic-
tions, although courts in both types of jurisdiction found them in a roughly equal 
proportion of the lawsuits in which they considered them. More plaintiffs crossed 
the Gingles threshold in noncovered jurisdictions, but plaintiffs who did so pre-
vailed in a greater proportion of the cases published in covered jurisdictions.21  
State vs. Local Practices 
In both covered and noncovered jurisdictions, many more Section 2 law-
suits challenged local electoral practices than statewide ones, and in both types 
of jurisdictions, plaintiffs were more likely to prevail in local suits than in state-
wide ones. Even so, in covered jurisdictions, the focus on local practices has 
been more pronounced. More plaintiffs challenged local procedures in covered 
jurisdictions than in noncovered ones, local challenges comprised a greater pro-
portion of the lawsuits plaintiffs brought in covered jurisdictions than in non-
covered, and plaintiffs prevailed in a greater proportion of the local challenges 
in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered, differences that are statistically sig-
nificant at the 90% level. Plaintiffs achieved favorable outcomes in 46.7% of 
Section 2 lawsuits challenging local practices in covered jurisdictions, and 
35.4% of such suits in noncovered jurisdictions.22 
                                                                 
19 See Appendix, Table 8.1; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13; Katz 
et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 655–56. Plaintiffs achieved suc-
cessful outcomes in 123 (or 37.2%) of the total lawsuits. Of these successful suits, ninety-
two documented a violation of Section 2— either on the merits or in the course of another 
favorable determination for the plaintiff. Another thirty-one lawsuits made a favorable 
determination for the plaintiff (such as issuing a preliminary injunction, granting a set-
tlement, awarding fees, or crafting a remedy) without stating whether Section 2 was actu-
ally violated. Of the 160 published lawsuits decided in covered jurisdictions, sixty-eight 
(42.5%) resulted in plaintiff success, compared with fifty-five (32.2%) of 171 lawsuits 
published in noncovered jurisdictions. Id. 
20 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (the minority group must dem-
onstrate, first, that it is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a 
majority in a single-member district;” second, that it is “politically cohesive;” and, third, 
that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special 
circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed—usually to defeat the 
minority’s preferred candidate”). 
21 Successful plaintiff outcomes comprise twenty-eight (93.3%) of the thirty such 
lawsuits that satisfied Gingles in covered jurisdictions, while amounting to twenty-nine 
(76.3%) of the thirty-eight such cases in noncovered ones. See VRI Database Master List, 
supra note 13. This difference is statistically significant at the 90% level (p = 0.058). 
22 See Appendix, Table 8.3; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13. Chal-
lenges to local practices, i.e., those of a county, city, town, or school board, comprise 235 
(or 71%) of the total reported Section 2 lawsuits, with 122 of 160 such lawsuits (or 
190 Ellen Katz 
  
Electoral practices implemented by counties in covered jurisdictions have 
been most vulnerable to challenge under Section 2, with plaintiffs obtaining favor-
able outcomes in 55.3% of the suits against county practices since 1982. Practices 
adopted by schools and by states as a whole, in covered and noncovered jurisdic-
tions alike, have been more resilient, with plaintiffs succeeding in 28.6% of the 
lawsuits brought against these entities. Electoral practices adopted by cities and 
towns have been more vulnerable in covered than in noncovered jurisdictions, 
with more plaintiffs prevailing in covered jurisdictions and in a greater proportion 
of the cases decided in these regions than in noncovered jurisdictions, although 
this difference is not statistically significant.23 
Changes vs. Longstanding Practices 
Section 2 challenges to electoral changes in covered jurisdictions overwhelm-
ingly address changes that have been precleared, given that Section 5 requires 
these jurisdictions to obtain preclearance for such changes. As a result, successful 
Section 2 challenges to these precleared practices constitute one area where Sec-
tions 2 and 5 do not overlap.24 To obtain preclearance, covered jurisdictions must 
demonstrate that electoral changes are discriminatory neither in purpose nor in 
effect, a standard the Supreme Court has interpreted to require a showing that the 
changes do not worsen, or cause retrogression to, existing opportunities for politi-
cal participation by minority voters.25 An electoral change might not make things 
worse for minority voters when measured under Section 5’s retrogression standard 
but might still be discriminatory in result within the meaning of Section 2.26  
More plaintiffs challenged newly enacted or changed (as opposed to long-
standing) electoral practices in noncovered jurisdictions than in covered ones.27 In 
                                                                                                                                                
76.3%) originating in covered jurisdictions, and 113 of 171 (or 66%) from noncovered 
ones. Id. 
23 See Appendix, Table 8.3; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13. 
Plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions succeeded in 46.3% of county challenges (twenty-five 
of fifty-four of such challenges in this region) compared to 36.4%, or twenty of fifty-five, 
such challenges in noncovered jurisdictions. Id.  
24 For examples, see, e.g., United States v. Charleston County, 365 F.3d 341 (4th 
Cir. 2004); Williams v. City of Dallas, 734 F. Supp. 1317 (N.D. Tex. 1990); see also Ma-
jor v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983) (citing case study of preclearance process 
and later Section 2 challenge outlined in SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN AND 
RICHARD H. PILDES, LAW OF DEMOCRACY 642–71 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter LAW OF 
DEMOCRACY]). 
25 See Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (Bossier Parish 
II); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). 
26 See, e.g., Warren v. City of Tampa, 693 F. Supp. 1051, 1053–54 (M.D. Fla. 1988), 
aff’d Warren v. City of Tampa, 893 F.2d 347 (11th Cir. 1989) (regarding replacement of 
at-large system with mixed system of at-large and district seats precleared then revised in 
settlement following Section 2 challenge). 
27 Plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdictions challenged such changes in ninety-two 
(53.8%) lawsuits. In covered jurisdictions, seventy-four (46.3%) of the Section 2 lawsuits 
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both covered and noncovered jurisdictions, postcensus reapportionment plans28 
account for the majority of the electoral changes challenged under Section 2. In 
covered jurisdictions, however, more plaintiffs prevailed in these challenges and 
did so in a statistically significantly greater proportion of the challenges brought.29  
Within covered jurisdictions, challenges to postcensus reapportionment plans 
were more successful than challenges to other types of electoral changes.30 The 
opposite trend occurred in noncovered jurisdictions, with plaintiffs more fre-
quently obtaining favorable outcomes in challenges to changes other than those 
involving postcensus reapportionment plans.31 Plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdic-
tions succeeded in 36.7% of lawsuits challenging these other electoral changes, 
while plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions succeeded in 28% of these suits. 
Challenged Practices 
Challenges to at-large elections comprise 146 of the 331 lawsuits examined, 
making at-large elections the electoral practice most often subject to challenge 
in published Section 2 lawsuits. More courts have struck down at-large elections 
and have done so in a greater proportion of the lawsuits decided in covered ju-
risdictions than in noncovered ones, although the difference between covered 
and noncovered jurisdictions on this point is not statistically significant.32  
                                                                                                                                                
challenged electoral changes. See Appendix, Table 8.6; see also VRI Database Master 
List, supra note 13. 
28 As used here, postcensus reapportionment plans refer to mandatory redistricting 
plans enacted every decade to comply with the one-person, one-vote mandate, see Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and are distinct from voluntary decisions to alter the 
structure of a districting system by, for instance, moving from single-member districts to 
at-large elections, from at-large to single-member districts, or from either regime to a 
plan including some combination of single-member and at-large seats. These latter sort of 
districting changes are counted in the “other electoral changes” category. 
29 See Appendix, Table 8.6; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13. 
Plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions won twenty-seven (55.1%) of the forty-nine challenges 
they brought against reapportionment plans. Plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdictions won 
nineteen (30.6%) of the sixty-two such challenges they brought against these plans. Id. 
30 Plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions obtained favorable outcomes, as described, id., 
in 55.1% of the challenges they brought to postcensus reapportionment plans, compared 
to the lower success rate of 28% (seven of twenty-five) of the challenges they brought to 
other types of electoral changes. See Appendix, Table 8.6; see also VRI Database Master 
List, supra note 13.  
31 These changes include challenges to the replacement of single-member with at-
large districts, the adoption of new residency requirements, and the institution of majority 
vote requirements. Plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdictions obtained favorable outcomes in 
eleven of the thirty (36.7%) challenges they brought to such changes. This success rate is 
greater than the 30.6% success rate plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdictions achieved when 
they challenged such reapportionment plans. See supra note 29; see also Appendix, Table  
8.4; VRI Database Master List, supra note 13. 
32 See Appendix, Table 8.4 (showing that at-large challenges constitute 47.8% of 
covered suits and 40.6% of noncovered suits, with a success rate of 50.6% for plaintiffs 
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In covered jurisdictions, challenges to at-large elections have declined in the 
years since 1982, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the lawsuits 
decided. In noncovered jurisdictions, at-large challenges have steadily declined as 
a proportion of the lawsuits decided, although plaintiffs brought more of these 
types of challenges in absolute numbers during the 1990s than they did during the 
1980s.33 
A total of 111 Section 2 lawsuits challenged postcensus reapportionment 
plans. Of these, forty-six ended with a favorable outcome for the plaintiffs. More 
plaintiffs challenged reapportionment plans in noncovered jurisdictions than in 
covered ones, but plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions prevailed in a statistically sig-
nificantly greater proportion of such suits. In both covered and noncovered juris-
dictions, Section 2 challenges to reapportionment plans have steadily increased as 
a proportion of lawsuits brought, with a greater increase occurring in noncovered 
jurisdictions.34  
Forty-one lawsuits challenged election administration procedures such as re-
quirements for registration, voting, or candidacy, or polling place rules or prac-
tices. Fourteen of these suits ended with a favorable outcome for the plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdictions challenged roughly the same number of elec-
tion procedures as did plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions, but prevailed in a greater 
proportion of these lawsuits, albeit one that is not statistically significant.35  
Thirteen lawsuits challenged majority-vote requirements such as a run-off re-
quirements, anti-single shot provisions, or numbered-place systems. Plaintiffs in 
covered jurisdictions brought ten of these challenges and prevailed in five of them. 
Plaintiffs prevailed in one of the three majority-vote challenges brought in non-
covered jurisdictions.36  
Thirty-nine Section 2 lawsuits addressed annexations, felon disfranchisement 
provisions, and appointment practices, and none of these ended with a favorable 
outcome for the plaintiffs. Seventeen of the lawsuits originated in covered jurisdic-
tions, while twenty-two originated in noncovered.37 
                                                                                                                                                
in covered jurisdictions, compared to a success rate of 40.6% in noncovered); see also 
Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 655–56. 
33 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 656; see also VRI 
Database Master List, supra note 13. 
34 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 656; see also Ap-
pendix, Table 8.4 (showing reapportionment challenge success rate of 55.1% in covered 
jurisdictions and 30.6% in noncovered); VRI Database Master List, supra note 13 (show-
ing that in covered jurisdictions, reapportionment plan challenges have gone from 27% of 
suits in the 1980s and 1990s, to 41.9% in the 2000s, and that in noncovered juisdictions, 
these suits have increased from 14.6% in the 1980s, to 39.3% in the 1990s, and 51.5% in 
the 2000s). 
35 See Appendix, Table 8.4 (showing that twenty suits in covered jurisdictions chal-
lenged election administration procedures, with 25% of them succeeding, compared to 
twenty-one such suits in noncovered jurisdictions, which had a 42.9% success rate); see 
also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13.  
36 Id.; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13. 
37 Id. 
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B. The Senate Factors 
More courts found Senate Factors 1 (history of official discrimination in vot-
ing), 3 (enhancing practices), and 7 (lack of minority candidate success) in cov-
ered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones. Courts in covered jurisdictions, more-
over, found these factors in a statistically significantly greater proportion of the 
lawsuits in which they addressed the Senate Factors than did courts in noncovered 
jurisdictions. Courts in covered jurisdictions have found factors 5 (socio-economic 
discrimination hindering present opportunities for political participation), 6 (racial 
appeals), and 9 (tenuous justification for challenged policy) in a greater number 
and proportion of cases than have courts in noncovered jurisdictions, although the 
differences on these factors are not statistically significant. Courts in covered and 
noncovered jurisdictions have found Senate Factors 2 (racial bloc voting), 4 (inac-
cessible slating process), and 8 (lack of responsiveness) in roughly equal numbers 
and proportions. Courts in covered jurisdictions making Factor 2 findings, though, 
documented elections showing more extreme racially polarized voting patterns 
than did courts in noncovered jurisdictions, a difference that is statistically signifi-
cant.38 
Some Senate Factors have figured more prominently in Section 2 lawsuits 
than others. Racial bloc voting has consistently been the factor on which Section 2 
liability most depends, with 105 judicial findings of racial bloc voting overall and 
62.6% of all favorable plaintiff outcomes including such a finding. Courts have 
also consistently found a history of discrimination (111 findings, found in 56.1% 
of successful suits), a lack of minority electoral success (90 findings, found in 
53.7% of successful suits), and socio-economic discrimination (88 findings, found 
in 47.2% of successful suits). Fewer courts adjudicating Section 2 lawsuits have 
found enhancing practices (52 findings, found in 29.3% of successful suits), racial 
appeals (33 findings, found in 16.3% of successful suits), a tenuous policy under-
lying the challenged policy (23 findings, found in 17.9% of successful suits), unre-
sponsive elected officials (20 findings, found in 12.2% of successful suits), and a 
discriminatory slating process (10 findings, found in 7.3% of successful suits). 
Some factors correlated more strongly with plaintiff success than others. 
Plaintiffs achieved a favorable result in 95.7% of the lawsuits that found a tenuous 
policy (Factor 9), 90% of those that identified a discriminatory slating process 
(Factor 4), 75% of the lawsuits that found nonresponsiveness (Factor 8), 73.3% of 
those that identified a lack of minority candidate success (Factor 7), 73.3% of 
those that found legally significant racial bloc voting (Factor 2), 69.2% of those 
                                                                 
38 This section compares Section 2 lawsuits that found a specific Senate factor to the 
total number of lawsuits that considered the Senate factors in each type of jurisdiction. 
Not every lawsuit identified included a published discussion of these factors, either be-
cause they did not need to reach the merits of the case or because the only published 
opinion documents a stage of the case, such as a settlement or remedy, when factor find-
ings are rarely necessary. In covered jurisdictions, courts in 105 lawsuits published factor 
analyses, while 131 did so in noncovered jurisdictions. See Appendix, Table 8.2; see also 
VRI Database Master List, supra note 13. 
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that identified use of an enhancing practice (Factor 3), 65.9% of those that found 
ongoing socio-economic discrimination (Factor 5), 62.2% of those that found a 
history of discrimination affecting the right to vote (Factor 1), and 60.6% of those 
finding racial campaign appeals (Factor 6). 
Extent of Official Discrimination in Voting 
The first factor listed in the Senate Report asks courts to assess “the extent 
of any history of official discrimination” in the jurisdiction that “touched the 
right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to 
participate in the democratic process.”39 More courts found Factor 1 in covered 
jurisdictions, and did so in a statistically significantly greater proportion of the 
lawsuits in which they engaged in factor analysis, than did courts in noncovered 
jurisdictions.40 
Thirty-three lawsuits—10% of the lawsuits suits decided—identified more 
than 100 instances of intentional, official discriminatory conduct in voting since 
1982. More courts identified instances of such conduct and did so in a greater pro-
portion of the lawsuits they decided in noncovered jurisdictions than in covered 
ones,41 although this difference is not statistically significant.  
These findings describe a wide range of conduct by public officials. In cov-
ered and noncovered jurisdictions alike, Factor 1 findings suggest that local offi-
cials more frequently engaged in intentional discriminatory conduct than did 
state officials and more frequently did so in the course of making new policies 
than when implementing existing ones.42  
                                                                 
39 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30. 
40 Covered jurisdiction lawsuits found this factor sixty-one times, or in 58.1% of the 
lawsuits to address the factors. Noncovered jurisdiction lawsuits found this factor fifty 
times, amounting to 38.2% of the relevant lawsuits. See Appendix, Table 8.2 (showing 
findings of the suits considering Senate factors); see also VRI Database Master List, su-
pra note 13.  
 These findings are unsurprising given that the coverage formula for targeted juris-
dictions is based on criteria Congress thought would capture regions that had just this 
history. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 115 (calling the trigger formula in section 
4 of the VRA “designed to identify jurisdictions with a history of voting discrimination”); 
see also id. at 5 (citing 111 CONG. REC. 8295 (1965)) (quoting Senator Javits on the pur-
pose of the act as aiming, “not only to correct an active history of discrimination, the 
denying to [minorities] of the right to register and vote, but also to deal with the accumu-
lation of discrimination . . . the bill would attempt to do something about accumulated 
wrongs and the continuance of the wrongs”); see also Senate Reauthorization Hearings, 
supra note 4 (May 16, 2006) (statement by Karlan). 
41 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 657 and n. 51 (list-
ing judicial findings); see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13  (showing that 
twelve (7.5%) of total covered suits found evidence of post-1982 intentional discrimina-
tion or a constitutional violation, compared with twenty-one such findings, amounting to 
12%, of the noncovered lawsuits). 
42 Id. at 675–95. 
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Courts in an additional thirty lawsuits documented a history of official dis-
crimination but either discounted the finding or concluded that such discrimination 
no longer affected contemporary voting rights. More courts made this finding in 
noncovered jurisdictions than covered jurisdictions.43 
Racial Bloc Voting 
Racial polarization in voting, also known as racial bloc voting, factors into 
the evaluation of Section 2 claims at two junctures. The second and third of the 
so-called Gingles preconditions instruct courts to determine whether minority 
voters are politically cohesive and whether white voters vote sufficiently as a 
bloc to defeat the minority-preferred candidate.44 Courts who so find (and also 
find the first Gingles factor45) must then evaluate whether the plaintiffs can sus-
tain their claim under “the totality of circumstances.”46 This inquiry includes 
analysis of Senate Factor 2, which calls for assessment of “the extent to which 
voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.”47 
In practice, however, courts that consider racial bloc voting since 1986 gener-
ally engage in one inquiry, typically under the Gingles factors.48 Of those that 
deem Gingles satisfied and proceed to the totality of circumstances review, some 
simply refer back to their previous analysis of racial bloc voting under Gingles. 
Other courts engage in additional analysis, typically examining within the totality 
of circumstances the question whether race is the cause of the polarized voting 
patterns identified under Gingles.49  
Of the 236 lawsuits that considered the Senate Factors, 105 (44.5%) found le-
gally significant racial bloc voting. Courts in covered and noncovered jurisdictions 
                                                                 
43 See id. at 676 and n.173, 695–97 (showing that twelve (16.4%) of the seventy-
three courts documenting official discrimination in covered jurisdictions decided that 
such discrimination no longer affected the right to vote, compared with eighteen (26.5%) 
of the sixty-eight courts finding official discrimination in noncovered jurisdictions). 
44 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). 
45 Id. at 50 (plaintiffs must show that the minority group is sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district). 
46 See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011–12 (1994). 
47 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30; see also BERNARD GROFMAN, L. 
HANDLEY AND R. NIEMI, MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUAL-
ITY 82–103 (1992) (describing the various tests and approaches expert witnesses have 
used in Section 2 cases to define and measure racially polarized voting). 
48 Decisions announced between the 1982 Amendments and the Court’s decision in 
Gingles obviously do not employ the Gingles test. Instead, these courts applied varied 
standards to evaluate racial bloc voting under Senate Factor 2. See Katz et al., Document-
ing Discrimination, supra note 13, at Part II.B.2. 
49 See, e.g., United States v. Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 277–78 
(D.S.C. 2003); Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1116 
(5th Cir. 1991); Gunn v. Chickasaw County, No. CIV.A. 1:92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 
33426761, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997) (Chickasaw County II); United States v. 
Alamosa County, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1029–33 (D. Colo. 2004); Lewis v. Alamance 
County, 99 F.3d 600, 604 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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alike found the existence of legally significant racial bloc voting in roughly the 
same number of lawsuits, with courts in covered jurisdictions making this finding 
in a greater, albeit not demonstrably statistically significant, proportion of the law-
suits in which they considered the Senate Factors.50 More courts finding legally 
significant racially polarized voting produced an outcome favorable to the plain-
tiffs in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones. They also did so in a greater 
proportion of the lawsuits in which they considered the Senate Factors, although 
this difference is not statistically significant.51  
When assessing racial bloc voting, courts have recorded election results from 
hundreds of state and local elections.52 Of the cases in which courts found legally 
significant racial bloc voting, courts in covered jurisdictions have documented 
racial polarization in specific elections that was more extreme than have courts in 
noncovered ones, and have done so at rates that are statistically significant. Of the 
specific minority versus white elections documented in covered jurisdictions,53 
                                                                 
50 See Appendix, Table 8.2 (showing fifty-two findings in covered jurisdictions and 
fifty-three in noncovered, which represents 49.5% of covered suits and 40.5% of noncov-
ered suits considering Senate factors); see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13. 
51 See VRI Database Master List, supra note 13 (showing that, of the suits finding 
racially polarized voting in each type of jurisdiction, forty-one (78.8%) reached a favor-
able outcome in covered, compared to thrity-six (or 67.9%) in noncovered suits). 
52 Courts provided information regarding the size of the white voting bloc in 202 
elections in covered jurisdictions and 257 elections in noncovered ones, sometimes in-
cluding averages representing multiple elections. See Appendix, Table 8.5. The numbers 
included here were derived from the election data provided by courts in the 105 Section 2 
lawsuits that found legally significant racial bloc voting. The analysis relies on the num-
bers courts most often provided, namely, details about either the number of white voters 
only voting for white candidates or the number or percentage of white voters who sup-
ported the minority candidate. Courts rarely provided a single level of overall polariza-
tion, opting instead to describe the levels in specific elections. See, e.g., St. Bernard Par-
ish, 2002 WL 2022589, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2002) (noting that, in the 1999 election 
for St. Bernard Parish Council, a black candidate received 5% of the white vote). When 
courts cited an average level of polarization for a series of elections, that average was 
counted for the total number of elections it represents, if that number was provided, or 
once if the court gave the average without providing the total number of elections. This 
analysis excludes examples in covered and noncovered jurisdictions that were difficult to 
compare consistently with other lawsuits. See, e.g., Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn, 
647 F. Supp. 1002, 1010 (D. Mont. 1986) (discussing data for 241 election contests from 
1978–1984 in a noncovered county of 12,671 people that showed average levels of white 
bloc voting of 86–96%). The analysis also could not include numbers where courts did 
not provide them. See, e.g., Gunn v. Chickasaw County II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22087, 
at *4 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (“as a general rule, whites in Chickasaw County vote for white 
candidates and blacks vote for black candidates”). 
53 See Appendix, Table 8.5; see also Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra 
note 13, at Part II.C.2; id. app., tbl., White Bloc Voting Levels Documented in Section 2 
Litigation, 1982–2005: Elections and Citations, at http://www.votingreport.org. Courts 
disagree about the probative value of elections involving only white candidates for pur-
poses of the racial bloc voting inquiry, and many lawsuits provided no details about such 
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80.7% involved white bloc voting rising to at least 80%, meaning that 80% or 
more of white voters voted exclusively for white candidates in these elections. In 
noncovered jurisdictions, by contrast, 40.9% of the elections documented involved 
white vote polarization of 80% or higher. 54  
In both covered and noncovered jurisdictions, the total number of findings of 
racially polarized voting has declined from the 1980s to the 2000s. Findings of 
legally significant racially polarized voting have declined in covered jurisdictions 
from thirty lawsuits in the 1980s, to sixteen in the 1990s, and to six since 2000. In 
comparison, findings in noncovered jurisdictions ranged from fifteen in the 1980s, 
to twenty-eight in the 1990s, and to ten in the 2000s.55  
Use of Enhancing Practices: At-large Elections, Majority Vote Requirements 
Senate Factor 3 inquires about the “extent to which the state or political 
subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority-vote require-
ments, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that 
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group.”56 
Courts in fifty-two lawsuits documented the use of at least one of these prac-
tices, with courts in covered jurisdictions being more than twice as likely as 
courts in noncovered jurisdictions to make such a finding.57 This difference is 
statistically significant. Courts in covered jurisdictions have nevertheless found 
Factor 3 less often over time.58 
Thirty-four lawsuits found majority-vote requirements, with 79% (all but 
seven) of these originating in covered jurisdictions. Twenty-six found anti-single 
                                                                                                                                                
elections. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at Part II.B.2. As a 
result, the analysis here includes data from only those elections involving a minority can-
didate where this was clear in the judicial opinion.  
54 See Appendix, Table 8.5.  
55 See VRI Database Master List, supra note 13. 
56 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30. Single shot voting is a practice by 
which voters can direct their votes to a single candidate running in a multimember district 
and choose not to cast their remaining votes for other candidates running at the same 
time. Doing so increases the relative weight of their votes by reducing the number of 
votes other candidates receive. An anti-single shot provision may prevent voters from 
doing this, typically by disqualifying any ballot where a voter has not used all available 
votes. See QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 46 (explaining the numbered place ballot 
system, a common type of anti-single shot provision: “[s]ingle shot voting is impossible 
if each candidate is required to qualify for a separate place or post (i.e., place no. 1, place 
no. 2, and so forth). Because every seat on the governing body is filled through a head-to-
head contest in which only one vote can be cast, there is no way to increase the mathe-
matical weight of one’s ballot by denying votes to other candidates.”). 
57 See Appendix, Table 8.2; see also VRI Database Master List and Katz et al., 
Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 698. 
58 See VRI Database Master List, supra note 13 (findings of Factor 3 in covered ju-
risdictions have declined as follows: eighteen in the 1980s, eleven in the 1990s, and four 
in the 2000s; compared, in noncovered jurisdictions, to the following: eight in the 1980s, 
ten in the 1990s, and one in the 2000s). 
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shot provisions, such as staggered terms and/or numbered-place requirements, 
with thirteen (50%) originating in covered jurisdictions. In roughly equal propor-
tions, courts in covered and noncovered jurisdictions found the use of an unusually 
large district, with five of the eleven findings coming from covered jurisdictions. 
Six courts, equally divided between covered and noncovered jurisdictions, found 
other enhancing practices, including the use of an automatic voter removal or 
“purge” law (based upon voting frequency), a short interval between an initial 
election and the runoff election, candidate registration fee, candidate residency 
requirement, or low financial compensation for elected officials.59  
At-large elections were challenged in 146 lawsuits, but courts based a Factor 
3 finding on their use in only thirteen lawsuits. Ten of these suits involved chal-
lenges to the at-large election itself, while the remaining three involved other prac-
tices.60 This highlights the trend among courts to invoke and find Factor 3 only 
when identifying practices other than the one challenged in the lawsuit, namely 
ones that “enhanced” the discriminatory results of the practice challenged.  
Candidate Slating 
Factor 4 asks whether members of the minority group have been denied ac-
cess to a candidate slating process if such a process exists in the jurisdiction.61 
While the Senate Report does not define the term discriminatory “slating,” the 
Fifth Circuit has described it as “a process in which some influential non-
governmental organization selects and endorses a group or ‘slate’ of candidates, 
rendering the election little more than a stamp of approval for the candidates 
selected.”62 Courts adjudicating Section 2 claims have rarely found slating, iden-
tifying a total of thirteen instances of slating or slating-like conduct, four of 
which originated in covered jurisdictions.63  
Eight instances of discriminatory slating involved political parties or their of-
ficers, seven of which originated in noncovered jurisdictions.64 Courts cited the 
                                                                 
59 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 698. 
60 Id.; Harris v. Siegelman, 695 F. Supp. 517 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (election proce-
dures); Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004) (redistricting); Jeffers v. 
Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (redistricting). 
61 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30. 
62 Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1116 
n.5 (5th Cir. 1991). 
63 See Appendix, Table 8.2. Courts in ten lawsuits expressly found the existence of a 
discriminatory slating process while courts in another three cases identified practices that 
sound in slating but discussed them in the context of another factor such as history of 
discrimination or racial appeals, see Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 
13, at 699; the four covered instances occur in: Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 969 F. Supp. 
749, 777 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 499 (5th 
Cir. 1987); Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1037 (D.S.D. 2004); Perez v. Pasa-
dena Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 1196, 1223–24 (S.D. Tex. 1997).  
64 Noncovered: Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Coalition For Fair Representation, 26 F.3d 
271, 276 (2d Cir. 1994); McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1030-31 (C.D. 
Ill. 1987); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, 
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failure of political parties to slate or endorse minority candidates, the decision to 
support minority candidates only when they ran from majority-minority districts, 
the exclusion of “endorsed” minority candidates from party-prepared campaign 
materials, and the express opposition to minority candidates by party officials who 
actively campaigned against them.65  
Three lawsuits, two of which originated in covered jurisdictions, document 
slating by private organizations, finding that electoral success hinged on the finan-
cial and endorsement support of certain private groups, which had rarely or never 
supported minority candidates.66 In contrast, the noncovered Marylanders litiga-
tion identified slating by state-funded, all-white fire departments on the Eastern 
Shore of Maryland.67 Finally, the 1997 City of LaGrange lawsuit from the covered 
state of Georgia inferred the existence of a discriminatory slating process because 
the absence of minority candidates “suggests a lack of opportunity, rather than a 
lack of inclination.”68 
Ongoing Effects of Discrimination (Education, Employment, Health) 
The fifth Senate Factor calls for evaluation of “the extent to which members 
of the minority group bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as educa-
tion, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively 
in the political process.”69 A roughly equal number of courts that engaged in 
                                                                                                                                                
2003 WL 21524820, at *12 (July 7, N.D.N.Y. 2003); New Rochelle Voter Defense Fund 
v. City of New Rochelle, 308 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Goosby v. Town of 
Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476, 483-86, 494 (2d Cir. 1999); Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Of-
fice of City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 824 F. Supp. 514, 537 & n.22 (1993); 
Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1056 (N.D. Ohio 1991). Covered: Shirt, 336 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1036.  
65 See, e.g., County of Albany, 2003 WL 21524820, at *12 (“minorities have gener-
ally been excluded from candidacy for County offices except in majority/minority dis-
tricts”); City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d at 276 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that a black candidate 
won the mayoral primary, that an influential group called the Democratic Town Commit-
tee failed to endorse him, and that the candidate lost the general election in an over-
whelmingly Democratic city); Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1037 (“[T]he chairman of the 
Democratic central committee in Bennett County actively campaigned against his own 
party’s nominees for county commissioner in the 2002 general elections after Indian can-
didates unseated the incumbent, non-Indian Democrats in the primary election.”); Ar-
mour, 775 F. Supp at 1056 (noting that an officially endorsed African-American candi-
date received zero votes in several precincts despite the fact that party rules required 
party officials, two of whom resided in such precincts, to support the party’s nominee); 
City of Philadelphia, 824 F. Supp. at 537 and n.22 (campaign materials distributed by the 
Democratic Party included all candidates running at-large for city council except one 
Latino and one African American). 
66 Covered: Gretna, 834 F.2d at 499; Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. at 
1223-24. Noncovered: City of Chicago Heights, 1997 WL 102543, at *9.  
67 Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1061 
(D. Md. 1994).  
68 City of LaGrange, 969 F. Supp. at 777.  
69 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30. 
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factor analysis found this factor in covered and noncovered jurisdictions, but 
they did so in a greater proportion of the covered lawsuits than in noncovered 
ones. The difference in proportion suggests a relationship but does not rise to 
conventional levels of statistical significance.70  
Many courts relied on voter registration rates as one way to gauge the minor-
ity group’s “ability to participate effectively in the political process.” Fourteen 
lawsuits in covered jurisdictions document minority voter registration rates that 
lag behind the white voter registration rate, compared with three such lawsuits in 
noncovered jurisdictions. Nine of the lawsuits from covered jurisdictions date 
from the 1980s, including one that found African-American voter registration in 
Mississippi in 1985 lagged twenty-five percentage points below that of whites.71 
The post-1990 findings report minority registration rates in covered jurisdictions 
that range from 9 to 32.1 points below that of whites.72   
Courts also evaluated levels of minority-voter turnout as a measure of effec-
tive political participation. Thirteen lawsuits in noncovered jurisdictions identified 
lower rates of minority-voter turnout, notwithstanding equivalent voter registration 
rates.73 Five lawsuits in covered jurisdictions found lower turnout alone,74 while 
four additional lawsuits in covered jurisdictions expressly found both that the mi-
nority-voter registration rate and minority-voter turnout rate lagged behind that of 
whites.75 Nearly equivalent levels of minority turnout or registration led courts in 
both covered and noncovered jurisdictions to conclude in roughly equal numbers 
that Factor 5 was not met.76 
Some courts looked beyond quantitative comparisons to consider how various 
forms of racial segregation affected the ability of minority groups to participate in 
the political process. Five of the six lawsuits to consider the effects of ongoing 
                                                                 
70 See Appendix, Table 8.2; Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, 
at 702; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13 (showing that courts found 
Factor 5 in 42.9% of covered suits considering Senate factors, compared to 32.8% of 
such noncovered suits). 
71 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 704–05; Missis-
sippi State Chapter, Operation Push, Inc. v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 1991). 
72 Askew v. City of Rome, 127 F.3d 1355, 1371 (11th Cir. 1997) (12.85-point 
black/white disparity in 1995); Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 294 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(19.8-point black/white registration gap as of 1996); Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 
976, 1039-40 (D.S.D. 2004) (20-point Indian/white disparity in 2000); City of La Grange, 
969 F. Supp. at 768 (32.1-point and 9-point black/white gaps in 1991 and 1995). 
73 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 704.  
74 U.S. v. Charleston County, 365 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2004); Citizens for a Bet-
ter Gretna v. City of Gretna, 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1119 (E.D. La. 1986); Jackson v. Edge-
field County, 650 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (D.S.C. 1986); Jordan v. City of Greenwood, 599 
F. Supp. 397, 401 (N.D. Miss 1984); United States v. Dallas County Comm’n, 739 F.2d 
1529, 1538 (11th Cir. 1984).  
75 Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1039–40; Neal v. Coleburn, 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 
(E.D. Va. 1988); McDaniels v. Mehfoud, 702 F. Supp. 588, 594 (E.D. Va. 1988); Ter-
razas v. Clements, 581 F. Supp. 1329, 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1984). 
76 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 705 and n. 345.  
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segregation probative of the Factor 5 inquiry originated in covered jurisdictions.77 
The district court in the Charleston County litigation observed severe societal and 
housing segregation and found that racial separation “makes it especially difficult 
for African-American candidates seeking countywide office to reach out to and 
communicate with the predominantly white electorate from whom they must ob-
tain substantial support to win an at-large election[.]”78 The district court in the 
Neal litigation concluded that similar segregation means “that whites in the 
County have historically had little personal knowledge of or social contact with 
blacks. . . . Quite simply, whites do not know blacks and are, as a result highly 
unlikely to vote for black candidates.”79 
Racial Appeals  
The sixth factor in the Senate Report instructs courts to assess whether politi-
cal campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals.80 In cov-
ered jurisdictions, 18 courts, comprising 17.1% of the lawsuits that considered the 
Senate Factors, found this factor, compared with fifteen findings (or 11.5%) in 
noncovered jurisdictions.81 These differences are not statistically significant.  
Some courts noted that campaigns generally have been marked by racial ap-
peals,82 but most decisions finding Factor 6 identified appeals in specific cam-
paigns. Courts have identified racial appeals in seventy-three specific elections 
occurring between 1950 and 2002, with forty-three of these appeals occurring in 
covered jurisdictions. Courts finding Factor 6 identified forty-seven specific racial 
appeals or campaigns characterized by racial appeals since 1982, thirty (63.8%) of 
which occurred in covered jurisdictions.83  
Section 2 lawsuits have construed a range of conduct to constitute a racial 
appeal. In covered and noncovered communities alike, racial appeals included 
advertisements with photographs that darkened the skin of minority candidates, 
efforts to link candidates with racially divisive figures, and the invocation of 
racially inflammatory issues and rhetoric in campaigns.84 
                                                                 
77 Id. at 706 (covered cases); Stabler v. County of Thurston, 129 F.3d 1015, 1023 
(8th Cir. 1997) (noncovered). 
78 Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 291.  
79 Neal, 689 F. Supp. at 1430.  
80 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30. 
81 See Appendix, Table 8.2; VRI Database Master List, supra note 13; Katz et al., 
Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 708; id. at 771–72, app., tbl. C, Racial 
Appeals Documented in Section 2 Litigation: Timeline and Citations, http://www.votin-
greport.org.  
82 See, e.g., Ward v. Columbus County, 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1105 (E.D.N.C. 1991) 
(noting the long history and continuing practice of using racial appeals in campaigns in 
Columbus County and North Carolina generally). 
83 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 708.  
84 Id. at 708–17.  
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Lack of Minority Electoral Success 
Under Senate Factor 7, courts are instructed to evaluate the “extent to which 
members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdic-
tion.”85 Courts examining the Senate Factors were more likely to find a lack of 
minority electoral success in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones, and 
did so at a rate that is statistically significant. Nearly one in two courts in cov-
ered jurisdictions found a lack of candidate success, compared to less than one 
in three courts in noncovered jurisdictions.86  
Courts evaluating Factor 7 looked primarily at election results, counting the 
number of minority candidates elected, typically over the course of several elec-
tions and even decades.87 Several cases distinguished election results occurring 
before the lawsuit was initiated and those filed afterwards and often discounted 
evidence of postfiling minority success as strategic efforts to frustrate the law-
suit.88 
Unsurprisingly, Factor 7 weighed heavily in the plaintiffs’ favor in cases 
where electoral results revealed a total absence or dearth of minority candidates 
winning election. Courts have repeatedly found a lack of minority success in this 
situation. In covered jurisdictions, twenty-four lawsuits challenging thirty-two 
governing bodies specifically found that no minority candidate had ever been 
elected in the post-1964 era. Fourteen lawsuits in noncovered jurisdictions chal-
lenging seventeen governing bodies made the same finding.89  
On the other hand, Factor 7 favored defendants where electoral results 
showed significant success of minority candidates. In twenty-two lawsuits, courts 
in noncovered areas found significant and sustained electoral success in the defen-
dant jurisdictions. Eight courts in covered jurisdictions made the same finding.90  
Electoral results do not constitute the entire inquiry under Factor 7. Numerous 
courts have considered the record of minority electoral success in conjunction with 
population statistics. While Section 2 is explicit that the statute provides no right to 
proportional representation,91 several courts viewed the absence of proportional 
                                                                 
85 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12 at 27–30. 
86 See Appendix, Table 8.2 (showing that of covered suits considering Senate Fac-
tors, 48.6% found a lack of minority candidate success, compared to 29.8% of such non-
covered suits; in absolute terms, fifty-one covered suits found a lack of success as com-
pared to thirty-nine noncovered); VRI Database Master List, supra note 13; Katz et al., 
Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 717–18. 
87 See, e.g., Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1319 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that 
no Hispanic candidate had won election to state legislature from the district since 1940). 
88 See, e.g., Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 1998); Gunn v. 
Chickasaw County II, No. CIV.A. 1:92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 33426761, at *4 (N.D. 
Miss. Oct. 28, 1997); Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285, 299 (M.D. La. 1988); McNeil 
v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1031 (C.D. Ill. 1987). 
89 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 718–19. 
90 See id.  
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2005) (providing that “nothing in this section establishes 
a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion 
in the population”). 
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representation as suggesting a lack of minority electoral success under Factor 7.92 
Others viewed evidence that minority officeholders approached or exceeded the 
proportion of minorities in the electorate as proof of minority electoral success.93  
Where minority electoral success hinges on the advantages of incumbency se-
cured through appointment, some courts have found that such “success” has little 
bearing on the ability of minority candidates to win elections generally.94 Others 
have viewed such evidence as indicating minority electoral success is possible.95  
Several lawsuits looked beyond electoral results to assess the number of mi-
nority candidates participating in given races. Some courts noted that the failure of 
minority citizens to “offer themselves” as candidates weighed against finding a 
lack of minority electoral success.96 Other courts, however, considered the possi-
bility that a dearth of minority candidates might itself stem from “the very barriers 
to political participation that Congress has sought to remove” and weighed the 
small number of minority candidates in favor of plaintiffs.97 
Lack of Responsiveness 
In addition to the seven “typical” factors listed above, the Senate Report 
adds two additional factors “that in some cases have had probative value” in 
establishing a Section 2 violation. The first, called here Factor 8, is whether 
there “is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to 
the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.”98 Few courts 
have found a lack of responsiveness, with twenty findings in 331 lawsuits. 
Courts in covered and noncovered jurisdictions found this factor in equal num-
bers and similar proportions.99  
Courts have more frequently found a lack of responsiveness when elected of-
ficials engaged in acts of official discrimination in covered jurisdictions.100 Non-
                                                                 
92 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 719 and n. 441. 
93 See id. at 720 and n. 442. 
94 See id. at 720 and nn. 450–51. 
95 See NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1021 (2d Cir. 1995); Askew 
v. City of Rome, 127 F.3d 1355, 1384 n.18 (11th Cir. 1997). 
96 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist., 780 F. Supp. 221, 226 (D. Del. 1991); 
McCarty v. Henson, 749 F.2d 1134, 1135 (5th Cir. 1984). 
97 See, e.g., Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1397–98 (5th Cir. 1996) (quot-
ing Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1208 
n. 9 (5th Cir. 1989)); see also Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 969 F. Supp. 749, 776 (N.D. 
Ga. 1997); LULAC v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 648 F. Supp. 596, 604 (W.D. Tex. 
1986); Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 833 (6th Cir. 1998).  
98 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 29. 
99 See Appendix, Table 8.2; VRI Database Master List, supra note 13; See Katz et 
al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 722. 
100 In eight cases where a court either made findings of post-1982 official discrimi-
nation or actually held that the jurisdiction had engaged in intentional discrimination in 
violation of the statute or Constitution, courts also found a lack of responsiveness—with 
six of these in covered jurisdictions. Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Education, 686 F. 
Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Brown v. Board of School Comm’rs, 706 F.2d 1103 (11th 
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discrimination sufficed to establish responsiveness in a number of lawsuits, but not 
all of them.101 Many courts looked for additional efforts on behalf of minority con-
stituents, ranging from the provision of services such as road paving, medical care, 
community policing, the creation of affirmative action hiring plans and staff train-
ing, or funding for community development.102 
Several courts defined responsiveness in procedural terms, examining the ex-
tent to which elected officials met with minority constituents, knew their concerns, 
campaigned in their neighborhoods, and otherwise encouraged minority political 
participation.103  
Tenuousness  
The second additional factor the Senate Report lists for consideration, called 
here Factor 9, is “whether the justification for the policy behind the practice is 
tenuous.”104 Courts in both covered and noncovered jurisdictions held the identi-
fied justification to be tenuous infrequently, in roughly equal numbers but in a 
greater proportion of the covered lawsuits to engage in factor analysis than in non-
covered ones. The difference in proportion suggests a relationship but does not rise 
to conventional levels of statistical significance.105 Twelve lawsuits addressed 
tenuousness in cases where defendants offered no justification for the challenged 
policy, of which two-thirds are from covered jurisdictions.106  
II. The Need for a Record, But of What Type? 
Congress approved reauthorization of Section 5 last summer, and President 
Bush promptly signed the legislation. The question that remains is whether the 
Supreme Court will let it stand. The Court has explicitly upheld Section 5’s va-
lidity in the past107 and specifically affirmed its continued constitutionality even 
                                                                                                                                                
Cir. 1983); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections of 
State of Ill., 574 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044 
(N.D. Ohio 1991); Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D 2004); Williams v. 
City of Dallas, 734 F. Supp. 1317 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Political Civil Voters Organization 
v. Terrell, 565 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Tex. 1983). 
101 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 723 and n. 470; 
id. at 724. 
102 Id. at 724–25 and nn. 474–86. 
103 Id. at 725–27. 
104 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30. 
105 See Appendix, Figure 8.2 (showing that 12.4% of covered suits considering fac-
tors, compared to 7.6% of noncovered suits, found a tenuous justification); VRI Database 
Master List, supra note 13; Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 
727. 
106 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 727–28. 
107 See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 284–85 (1999); City of 
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 
(1966). 
 Not Like the South? 205 
  
as the justices have articulated new, stringent limitations on congressional power 
to enforce civil rights in other contexts.108 Nevertheless, the Court’s willingness 
to uphold Section 5 as reauthorized remains far from certain. 
The reason stems largely from a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning 
in 1997. City of Boerne v. Flores announced the now familiar requirement that 
congressional legislation enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments must exhibit 
“congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied 
and the means adopted to that end.”109 The Court invalidated six federal statutes 
under this standard, specifically judging the congressional findings underlying 
each statute insufficient to justify the statutory proscriptions involved.110 The 
Court’s two most recent Boerne decisions uphold congressional enactments based 
on thinner records than those deemed inadequate in the original decisions,111 but 
they nevertheless continue to emphasize “the extent and specificity” of the uncon-
stitutional state conduct needed as a predicate for congressional action.112 Read 
                                                                 
108 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001); 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626–27 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U.S. 62, 88–89 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 639 and n.5 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
518 (1997); see also Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736–38 
(2003); id. at 742–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 547–48 
(2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See generally Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Represen-
tation: Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the 
Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2368 n. 157 (2003). 
109 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
110 See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Title I of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 
(2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Ex-
pense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Florida Prepaid II) (Patent and 
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act); College Savings Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (Florida Prepaid I) 
(Trademark Remedy Clarification Act); Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act). 
111 Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), and Tennes-
see v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520–22 (2004), upheld the Family Medical Leave Act and 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, respectively. These decisions may signal 
the Court’s greater deference to Congress when challenged statutes implicate a suspect 
classification or fundamental right. See Erwin Chemerinsky, New Federalism: Real Dis-
crimination?, 16 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 97, 118 (2004) (“Together Lane and Hibbs es-
tablish that Congress has more authority to act under Section 5 . . . when it is dealing with 
claims of discrimination or violations of rights which receive heightened scrutiny.”); but 
see Vikram David Amar, The New “New Federalism”: The Supreme Court in Hibbs (and 
Guillen), 6 GREEN BAG 2d 349, 351–54 (2003) (arguing that the heightened scrutiny for 
gender classifications notwithstanding, Hibbs is irreconcilable with Boerne and Morri-
son). 
112 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 733–34 and n.11 (2003); Lane, 541 U.S. at 528–29 
(“sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of unconstitutional dis-
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together,113 the Boerne decisions suggest that Congress can rely on neither general 
assertions nor isolated examples of unconstitutional conduct,114 but instead must 
document a widespread pattern of such conduct by entities of the sort being sub-
ject to suit.115  
Many people read Boerne and its progeny to signal that the reauthorization of 
Section 5 will survive constitutional scrutiny only if the congressional record un-
derlying the statute documents pervasive unconstitutional conduct in covered ju-
risdictions.116 To the extent the Court will require such a record,117 the Section 2 
decisions offer one source for identifying recent instances of unconstitutional con-
duct related to voting. While Section 2’s results-based test for discrimination in 
voting prohibits conduct that would not necessarily violate the Constitution,118 
eighteen Section 2 decisions, eight of which originated in covered jurisdictions, 
identified unconstitutional conduct.119 As important, courts assessing the Senate 
                                                                                                                                                
crimination” demonstrated through “judicial findings of unconstitutional state action, and 
statistical, legislative, and anecdotal evidence of the widespread exclusion of persons 
with disabilities from the enjoyment of public services”). 
113 But cf. supra note 111. 
114 See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370 (dismissing “unexamined, anecdotal accounts 
of ‘adverse, disparate treatment by state officials,’” when found outside the formal legis-
lative findings); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90 (2000) (rejecting as insufficient “assorted sen-
tences . . . cobble[d] together from a decade’s worth of congressional reports and floor 
debates” as either general unsubstantiated assertions or isolated anecdotal examples). 
While the Court has not wholly rejected anecdotal evidence suggesting unconstitutional 
conduct, it has treated such examples with considerable skepticism and indicated its pref-
erence for examples of adjudicated constitutional violations. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. 
at 375–76 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting absence of “confirming judicial documenta-
tion” in the form of court decisions addressing unconstitutional discrimination by States 
against people with disabilities). 
115 See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (finding that Congress failed “to uncover any sig-
nificant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination,” and that it lacked “evidence of wide-
spread and unconstitutional age discrimination by the States”); Florida Prepaid I, 527 
U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (concluding that “Congress identified no pattern of such [patent] 
infringement [by the States], let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”); City of 
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (noting absence of evidence documenting “some widespread 
pattern of religious discrimination in this country”); id. at 526 (noting absence of a 
“widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights”). 
116 See, e.g., supra note 6; see also Richard L. Hasen, What Congress Should Con-
sider Before Renewing the Voting Rights Act: A Chance to Preempt Supreme Court In-
validation, and Better Protect Minority Voting Rights, FindLaw (May 30, 2006) 
(“[T]here is a very serious risk that the Roberts Court would strike down a renewed sec-
tion 5 as unconstitutional.”), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20060530_ 
hasen.html. 
117 For the argument why it should not, see infra notes 124–152 and accompanying 
text. 
118 See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
119 For lawsuits expressly finding both constitutional and Section 2 violations, see 
Arakaki v. Hawaii, 314 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 
F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Board of School Comm’rs, 706 F.2d 1103 (11th Cir. 
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factors in the course of adjudicating Section 2 cases have documented evidence 
that reveals a wide range of unconstitutional conduct by state and local officials. 
While these judicial findings are not formal adjudications of unconstitutional con-
duct, they represent the considered judgment of federal judges that the evidence 
they reviewed in the course of litigation reveals conduct that runs afoul of the 
Constitution.120  
Standing alone, however, these findings do not appear to establish the sort of 
record the Court has required in the Boerne decisions.121 While courts evaluating 
Section 2 claims in covered jurisdictions have documented pervasive, systematic 
racial discrimination linked to voting in specific locations in recent years,122 courts 
in noncovered regions have identified official conduct of a similar character.123 In 
both regions, moreover, findings of unconstitutional conduct in specific Section 2 
cases may in fact be relatively isolated examples of misconduct and not emblem-
                                                                                                                                                
1983); NAACP v. Gadsden County, 691 F.2d 978 (11th Cir. 1982); City of New Rochelle, 
308 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. 
Ark. 1990); Marks v. Stinson, 1994 WL 146113, at * 33–4 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Armour v. 
Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991); League of United Latin American Citizens v. 
Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 648 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Tex. 1986); Political Civil Voters 
Org’n v. Terrell, 565 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Tex. 1983); see also Haywood County, 544 F. 
Supp. 1122 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) (preliminary injunction based on proven Section 2 viola-
tion and likely success on constitutional claim); Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502  (D.R.I. 
1982) (declaratory and injunctive relief based on “constitutional error” and implied Sec-
tion 2 violation). For lawsuits finding discriminatory intent and effect under Section 2, 
see Dillard v. Town of North Johns, 717 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (M.D. Ala. 1989); Harris v. 
Siegelman, 695 F. Supp. 517, 525 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Dillard v. Baldwin Bd. of Ed., 686 
F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473, 1485 (M.D. 
Ala. 1983); see also United States v. Town of Cicero, 2000 WL 34342276, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
2000) (preliminary injunction based on likely success on showing purposeful discrimina-
tion under Section 2); Dillard v. Crenshaw, 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (M.D. Ala. 1986) 
(same). 
120 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 675–97. 
121 To the extent that Hibbs and Tennessee v. Lane signal the Court’s greater defer-
ence to Congress in cases implicating a suspect classification or fundamental right, the 
reauthorization of Section 5 may be less vulnerable than commonly believed with the 
Section 2 findings providing a good portion of the record that is required. See supra note 
111. 
122 See, e.g., Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1024-28 (D.S.D. 2004); United 
States v. Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 286 n.23 (D.S.C. 2003); Hall v. 
Holder, 955 F.2d 1563, 1570–71 (11th Cir. 1992); Williams v. City of Dallas, 734 F. 
Supp. 1317, 1324 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Town of North Johns, 717 F. Supp. 1471, 1477 
(M.D. Ala. 1989); Harris v. Siegelman, 695 F. Supp. 517, 527 and n.8 (M.D. Ala. 1988); 
Harris v. Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128, 133 (M.D. Ala. 1984); Dillard v. Crenshaw 
County, 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1356, 1360–61 (M.D. Ala. 1986). 
123 See, e.g., United States v. Berks County, 250 F. Supp. 2d 525, 527 (E.D. Pa. 
2003); Cuthair v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1162 (D. Colo. 
1998); Stabler v. County of Thurston, 129 F. 3d 1015, 1022–23 (8th Cir. 1997); Jeffers v. 
Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 210 (E.D. Ark. 1989). 
208 Ellen Katz 
  
atic of a widespread pattern of such conduct in covered or noncovered regions as a 
whole. 
To be sure, the Section 2 findings reflect the limitations that inhere in reliance 
on published Section 2 case law as a source for describing opportunities for politi-
cal participation nationwide.124 Judicial application of the Senate Factors in pub-
lished Section 2 decisions offers selective snapshots of participation in the respec-
tive jurisdictions, not a comprehensive and systematic overview. And yet, the in-
ability of these findings to satisfy the Boerne standard, at least in its strongest 
form, stems not simply from the inherent limits of the data set. In fact, no source 
will document the widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct the Boerne deci-
sions demand because official discrimination in covered jurisdictions is no longer 
as prevalent as it once was.  
This assertion will alarm proponents of reauthorization who believe the con-
tinued validity of Section 5 depends on such a record. This belief, however, is 
mistaken. Section 5 is fundamentally different from the statutes at issue in the 
Boerne cases, and this difference renders the Boerne doctrine inapplicable to reau-
thorization, at least in the sense that the prevailing discussion seems to assume.  
All the Boerne decisions involved the question whether a problem Congress 
sought to address was significant enough to warrant a new congressional statute. 
In that context, documentation of pervasive unconstitutional conduct signals a 
problem in need of a remedy. By contrast, reauthorization of an existing statute 
presents a distinct question. The issue is not whether a new statute is needed, but 
instead whether an existing one should continue. Here, the Court should not re-
quire evidence of widespread unconstitutional conduct because the statute at issue 
is already operational. Section 5, after all, was put in place more than forty years 
ago to address precisely the type of pervasive discrimination the Boerne cases 
demand for new legislation. As a consequence, the validity of reauthorization can-
not depend on evidence that such discrimination persists largely unchanged. To 
require otherwise would limit reauthorization to statutes that are ineffectual.  
Put differently, Section 5’s very success in addressing racial discrimination in 
voting is itself neither proof that preclearance has become obsolete nor license for 
the statute to continue indefinitely. The question whether preclearance is still 
needed depends not on a raw assessment of the present scope of unconstitutional 
conduct in covered jurisdictions, but instead on a predictive judgment about the 
likely prevalence of such conduct absent the constraints imposed by Section 5. 
This question can only be answered through speculation about whether Section 5 
has achieved its goals, broadly understood.  
For four decades, the preclearance requirement has sought to suppress mani-
festations of racial discrimination in voting by “shift[ing] the advantages of time 
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.”125 The hope, however, 
was that Section 5 would do even more. Because Congress enacted Section 5 as a 
temporary measure and repeatedly extended it for only circumscribed periods, 
                                                                 
124 See supra note 14. 
125 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). 
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preclearance is necessarily premised on the belief that controlling the symptoms of 
racial discrimination can ultimately cure the underlying disease. In this sense, Sec-
tion 5 might be understood as a behavior modification program, one designed not 
simply to check certain conduct during the pendency of the program but instead to 
bring about lasting changes in behavior and attitude. 
Without doubt, Section 5 has been extraordinarily successful in controlling 
discrimination in voting. While blatantly unconstitutional conduct has hardly been 
eradicated, contemporary manifestations of racial discrimination in voting are jar-
ring precisely because they are no longer the norm, as they were before Section 5 
was implemented.126 Less clear is whether Section 5 has successfully achieved its 
larger ambition not simply to suppress discrimination in voting but to change the 
attitudes that, if left unchecked, give rise to the behavior. The overall decline in 
unconstitutional conduct no doubt stems, at least in part, from changed attitudes.127 
And yet, the need to traverse the preclearance process, as well as simply the pros-
pect of needing to do so, inevitably constrains discriminatory behavior to a signifi-
cant degree.128 
Here, the Section 2 decisions offer some basis to consider how covered juris-
dictions might look absent Section 5. On the one hand, judicial findings in many 
Section 2 cases suggest fundamentally changed attitudes. Section 2 findings 
document successful minority candidacies for a range of public offices in covered 
jurisdictions, with minority electoral representation exceeding proportional repre-
sentation in some areas.129 These findings record instances in which minority can-
didates run successfully not just from majority-minority districts, but in at-large 
elections and districts in which minority voters do not comprise a majority of vot-
ers.130  
                                                                 
126 See, e.g., Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1024–28; Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 
at 286 n.23. 
127 See, e.g., Kevin Sack, In the Rural White South, Seeds of a Biracial Politics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1998, at A1. 
128 See, e.g., Tex. H.J. (78th Sess., 11th day, Oct. 10, 2003) (statement by Represen-
tative Phil King) (“quite frankly, it’s very, very difficult to draw a district in South Texas 
because of the Voting Rights Act and the only way you can do it, is to do it in the manner 
in which we did”); Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 773 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (“By 
the time the plan now under attack was first proposed, the Voting Rights Act had effec-
tively taken six Democratic Party seats off the table, rendering them untouchable . . . ”); 
see also Pamela S. Karlan, Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance Under the Vot-
ing Rights Act, at 16 (June 14, 2006), American Constitution Society Issue Briefs, 
http://www.acslaw.org/node/2964 (“Jurisdictions that know that a change will not be 
precleared may decide not even to attempt making it.”). 
129 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
130 Boddie v. City of Cleveland, 297 F. Supp. 2d 901, 908 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (minor-
ity success in city and countywide elections); NAACP v. Fordice, 252 F.3d 361, 371 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (minority success in at-large election where black voting age population was 
26.88%); City of Rome, 127 F.3d at 1384 n.18 (finding that meaningful “biracial coali-
tions” exist and promote successful minority and minority-preferred candidates); see also 
Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 1714 (noting that “the major Supreme Court cases of the past 
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Section 2 findings, moreover, document that minority voters in some covered 
jurisdictions register and vote “without hindrance,” and in some areas do so at a 
rate comparable to or greater than that of white residents.131 Courts have docu-
mented numerous instances in which public services are distributed in a nondis-
criminatory manner, as well as instances in which some minority neighborhoods 
receive greater services than nonminority ones. Courts have found that elected 
officials in various covered jurisdictions are generally responsive to the needs of 
the minority community.132 Compared, moreover, to the first years after Section 2 
was amended, fewer courts in recent years have found covered (and noncovered) 
jurisdictions using “enhancing devices” and fewer have found legally significant 
racial bloc voting in these jurisdictions.133 Finally, since 1982 courts in covered 
jurisdictions have documented fewer, albeit not to a statistically significant degree, 
instances of official intentional discrimination as well as fewer Section 2 viola-
tions that simultaneously violated the Constitution than courts in noncovered ju-
risdictions.134  
Taken together, these findings may well suggest a vital new way of thinking 
in covered jurisdictions. And yet, because these developments occurred in com-
munities subject to the constraints imposed by Section 5, and, without doubt, were 
shaped by them,135 the question arises whether they would persist in the absence of 
the preclearance process. That courts in covered jurisdictions have not docu-
mented extensive intentional racial discrimination of the sort Congress meant Sec-
tion 5 to block may mean nothing more than that Section 5 is fulfilling its most 
basic mission, namely, blocking covered jurisdictions from “pour[ing] old poison 
into new bottles.”136  
Indeed, a broader comparison of the judicial findings in covered and noncov-
ered jurisdictions suggests caution before concluding that preclearance has trans-
formed the sentiments that long propelled discriminatory conduct in covered juris-
dictions. This comparison shows that distinct vestiges of discrimination persist in 
                                                                                                                                                
decade addressing minority representation, beginning with Shaw v. Reno, have all arisen 
from claims of southern politics being too solicitous of minority political claims.”). 
131 McCarty v. Henson, 749 F.2d 1134, 1135 (5th Cir. 1984); see supra note 76 and 
accompanying text. 
132 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 722. 
133 See text accompanying supra note 55; see also supra note 58 and accompanying 
text. 
134 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
135 See Peyton McCrary, C. Seaman and R. Valelly, The End of Preclearance as We 
Knew It: How the Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 275, 297–99 (2006) (finding that the preclearance process has repeat-
edly blocked proposed electoral changes based on evidence of bad intent); see also Pam-
ela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L. 
J. 21, 36 (2004) (arguing that “the gains minority voters have achieved over the last four 
reapportionment cycles . . . have all occurred in the shadow of Section 5, which has given 
minority voters and their representatives an invaluable bargaining chip”). 
136 Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 366 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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covered jurisdictions such that the elimination of Section 5 would hardly be incon-
sequential. 
Of particular note is that covered jurisdictions account for the majority of the 
Section 2 lawsuits in which plaintiffs achieved successful outcomes since 1982.137 
This greater success is noteworthy given that the opposite trend might have been 
anticipated. Less than one-quarter of the U.S. population resides in covered juris-
dictions,138 courts in the region arguably apply standards that make success on a 
Section 2 claim more difficult,139 and the preclearance process blocks some por-
tion of discriminatory electoral changes that might otherwise be challenged under 
Section 2.  
To be sure, Section 2 and Section 5 are not coextensive, with each proscribing 
some conduct that would be permissible under the other.140 Still, they are not 
wholly distinct, and a large number of electoral practices run afoul of both provi-
sions. Where they do, preclearance should block such practices as retrogressive 
and thereby eliminate the need for plaintiffs to challenge them under Section 2. As 
a result, if governmental officials in each jurisdiction have equal propensity to 
engage in conduct prohibited by Section 2, one might have anticipated a greater 
number of successful Section 2 lawsuits in noncovered jurisdictions, where, by 
definition, preclearance does not operate. More Section 2 plaintiffs have neverthe-
less succeeded in covered jurisdictions even though a narrower range of practices 
is likely to be challenged under Section 2.  
This phenomenon is most pronounced at the local level, where most objec-
tions interposed by the Department of Justice in the preclearance process have 
been made.141 Even in this context, where preclearance operates most vigorously 
                                                                 
137 See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 655–56 (noting 
sixty-eight successful plaintiffs’ outcomes in covered jurisdictions and fifty-five else-
where). 
138 The raw numbers are 67,767,900 out of 281,421,906 (24% of the U.S. popula-
tion). See U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2000, Demographic Profiles: 100% 
and Sample Data: Demographic Profile Data Search, http://censtats.census. gov/pub/Pro-
files.shtml (last visited September 14, 2006). In addition, these data show that 39.3% of 
African Americans, 31.8% of Hispanics or Latinos, and 24.8% of Native Americans in 
the United States live in Section 5-covered areas. Id. (Demographic Data Profiles, 
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/demoprofiles.html (last visited Sep-
tember 14, 2006)). 
139 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Clements, 999 F.2d 
831, 850 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (requiring plaintiffs prove race caused polarized vot-
ing trends in order to satisfy the third Gingles precondition); see also Elizabeth Ryan, 
Note, Post-LULAC Section 2 Claims in the Fifth Circuit, 105 MICH. L. REV.___ (2006) 
(forthcoming unpublished manuscript at 34, on file with author) (concluding that in the 
post-LULAC 5th Circuit, “[w]henever a defendant can introduce evidence of non-racial 
factors . . . plaintiffs lose”). 
140 See supra note 10 and notes 32–37 and surrounding text. 
141 See Michael J. Pitts, Let’s Not Call the Whole Thing Off Just Yet: A Response to 
Samuel Issacharoff’s Suggestion to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L. 
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to block electoral changes, covered jurisdictions still are the subject of more suc-
cessful Section 2 challenges than are noncovered jurisdictions, where preclearance 
is not screening out any of the challenges to local practices.142  
A comparison of the underlying judicial findings in Section 2 litigation helps 
explain the greater number of successful Section 2 claims in covered jurisdictions. 
Compared with courts in noncovered jurisdictions, more courts in covered juris-
dictions have documented evidence of nonactionable bias, that is, racially dis-
criminatory conduct that violates no law, generally because private actors are en-
gaging in it. Examples include more extreme levels of racial bloc voting and more 
election campaigns featuring racial appeals. Courts in covered jurisdictions have 
also identified as salient various vestiges of discrimination at a higher rate, 
namely, circumstances that are reasonably likely to follow from past active dis-
crimination, such as depressed levels of minority voter registration and turnout, 
and the persistence of racial segregation found to hinder minority political partici-
pation.143 
More courts have found a history of official discrimination in voting in cov-
ered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones, a finding that helps explain why more 
courts find nonactionable bias and salient vestiges of discrimination in covered 
jurisdictions than in noncovered ones. More courts in covered jurisdictions than in 
noncovered ones have documented the use of various electoral “devices” that en-
hance opportunities for discrimination against minority groups, devices that give 
expression to nonactionable bias and exacerbate the impact of various vestiges of 
past discrimination. All these factors contribute to a lack of minority candidate 
success, a finding consistently made by more courts in covered jurisdictions than 
in noncovered ones.144  
None of this, of course, establishes a contemporary constitutional violation.145 
Section 2’s totality of circumstance inquiry nevertheless calls for examination 
based on the view that things like nonactionable bias, the vestiges of discrimina-
tion, historic official discrimination in voting, and the employment of practices 
that enhance opportunities for discrimination all impede minority political partici-
pation and render electoral practices more likely to result in actionable discrimina-
tion against minority groups. While this actionable discrimination is not necessar-
ily unconstitutional discrimination, the reasons that render these problems proba-
tive of a Section 2 violation also make them indicia of an environment in which 
                                                                                                                                                
REV. 605, 612 (2005) (arguing that the greatest impact of Section 5 and the VRA has 
been to police voting discrimination at the local level). 
142 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra notes 50–54, 70–72, and 81–84 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
145 As amended, Section 2’s “results”-based test for discrimination in voting goes 
beyond what the Constitution alone proscribes. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 
55, 60–61 (1980).  
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past unconstitutional conduct has yet to be fully remedied and future constitutional 
injuries may arise.146  
The Supreme Court has so recognized, or, more precisely, affirmed Con-
gress’s power to make this determination. Katzenbach v. Morgan147 upheld the ban 
on literacy tests set forth in Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, because 
such tests excluded members of New York City’s Puerto Rican community from 
casting a ballot. The concern was both that the tests themselves were the product 
of prohibited discrimination and that the use of such tests fostered “discrimination 
in governmental services.”148 Morgan recognizes congressional power to ban this 
literacy test both as a remedy for past discrimination and also to protect the people 
the test excluded from future governmental discrimination. Morgan posits that 
people denied access to the franchise are more likely to confront such discrimina-
tion, and accordingly upholds congressional power to enact Section 4(e) because 
doing so “enhanced political power [that] will be helpful in gaining nondiscrimi-
natory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican community.”149 
City of Boerne v. Flores is known, in part, for its rejection of a distinct propo-
sition long linked with Morgan, specifically, the suggestion that Congress may 
enact legislation that “expands” rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.150 
Boerne, however, assiduously affirmed the two rationales for Morgan’s holding, 
namely, congressional power to ban New York’s English literacy test as a reme-
dial measure for official discrimination in establishing voter qualification,151 and 
congressional power to ban the test as a mechanism to address future discrimina-
tion in public services.152  
Boerne and Morgan accordingly provide a framework under which the Su-
preme Court might uphold the reauthorization of Section 5 as both a remedial 
measure and a measure to block future discrimination. To be sure, Sections 4(e) 
and 5 are distinct, with one blocking an English literacy test as a prerequisite to 
voting and the other preventing covered jurisdictions from implementing any elec-
toral change without first obtaining preclearance. Boerne, however, was careful to 
affirm the legitimacy not only of Section 4(e) but also of Section 5, which the de-
cision presents as the paradigm of congruent and proportional congressional legis-
lation.  
                                                                 
146 Cf. Hasen, supra note 8, at 190–94 (arguing that a potential for mischief is not 
the same as mischief itself and that nonstate action evidence is not a constitutionally ac-
ceptable substitute for evidence of intentional discrimination). 
147 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
148 Id. at 653. 
149 Id. at 652. 
150 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997) (noting language in 
Morgan that “could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legis-
lation that expands the rights contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and 
finding that “[a]ny suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under 
the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our caselaw.”). 
151 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528; Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654. 
152 521 U.S. 507, 528 (1996). See also Katz, supra note 108, at 2395–96. 
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Whether Section 5 remains so after reauthorization is a complex and difficult 
question. Judicial findings in Section 2 lawsuits since 1982 attest to much of what 
Section 5 has accomplished. A comparison of these findings from covered and 
noncovered jurisdictions nevertheless suggests the many ways in which relevant 
differences persist.  
III. Conclusion 
Federal judges adjudicating Section 2 claims are not social scientists. Their 
charge is not to produce a comprehensive portrait of political participation na-
tionwide or even in the jurisdictions where electoral practices have been chal-
lenged. Section 2’s totality of circumstances test functions instead much like a 
camera, distributed to courts in Section 2 litigation with instructions to photo-
graph specific items. A quarter-century after the 1982 amendments to Section 2, 
federal judges have produced thousands of snapshots that offer selective but still 
probative images of political participation in covered and noncovered jurisdic-
tions.  
The quality of these images depends on various factors. These include the 
skill and diligence of, and resources available to, the attorneys involved in Section 
2 litigation, as well as judicial predilections for interpreting the Voting Rights Act 
narrowly or expansively, for making detailed findings, and for publishing deci-
sions that are reached. To the extent, however, that these factors vary in similar 
ways in covered and noncovered jurisdictions, the differences between the judicial 
findings in Section 2 lawsuits in these jurisdictions suggest real differences operat-
ing on the ground in these regions. 
The significance of these differences is a matter of debate. But it is a debate 
about differences such as these that we should be having. The debate about the 
validity of reauthorization has instead focused for too long on the wrong question. 
The scope of unconstitutional conduct in covered jurisdictions cannot tell us 
whether preclearance is still needed. The debate should focus on evidence that 
might be more definitive given that the validity of reauthorization turns on it.  
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Appendix 
Table 8.1. Total Lawsuits and Success in Voting Rights Act Section 2 
Litigation, 1982–2005 
 
Covered Jurisdictions  
Year Decided Total Lawsuits Success % Success 
1980s 59 35 59.3% 
1990s 72 27 37.5% 
2000s 29 6 20.7% 
Grand Total 160 68 42.5% 
 
Noncovered Jurisdictions 
Year Decided Total Lawsuits Success % Success 
1980s 41 21 51.2% 
1990s 84 23 27.4% 
2000s 46 11 23.9% 
Grand Total 171 55 32.2% 
Overalla  
Year Decided Total Lawsuits Success % Success 
1980s 100 56 56.0% 
1990s 156 50 32.1% 
2000s 75 17 22.7% 
Grand Total 331 123 37.2% 
 
 
a The chi-square value analyzing the contingency table with covered/noncovered ju-
risdictions versus successful/unsuccessful grand total is 3.782 (df = 1, p = 0.052).  
Source: Ellen D. Katz & The Voting Rights Initiative, www.votingreport.org (2006).  
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Table 8.2. Senate Factor Findings in Post–1982 Section 2 Litigation, 
of All Suits Considering Factors 
 
 
Covered  
Jurisdictions 
Noncovered  
Jurisdictions  
Total  
Lawsuits 160 100% 171 100%  
 
Considered  
Factors 105 65.6% 131 76.6%  
Of Suits Considering Factors: p > χ 2 
Found Factor 1 61 58.1% 50 38.2% 0.002 
Found Factor 2 52 49.5% 53 40.5% 0.164 
Found Factor 3 33 31.4% 19 14.5% 0.002 
Found Factor 4 4 3.8% 6 4.6% 0.975 
Found Factor 5 45 42.9% 43 32.8% 0.113 
Found Factor 6 18 17.1% 15 11.5% 0.210 
Found Factor 7 51 48.6% 39 29.8% 0.003 
Found Factor 8 10 9.5% 10 7.6% 0.604 
Found Factor 9 13 12.4% 10 7.6% 0.222 
All Gingles  
Factors 30 28.6% 38 29.0% 0.941 
 
 
Source: Ellen D. Katz & The Voting Rights Initiative, www.votingreport.org (2006).  
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Table 8.3. Local v. State Government Challenges under Section 2, 
1982–2005a 
 
  
 
Covered  
Jurisdictions 
 
Noncovered  
Jurisdictions 
Level of Gov’t Total 
 
Success Total Success 
State 38 11 28.9% 58 15 25.9% 
Local  122 57 46.7% 113 40 35.4% 
    County 47 26 55.3% 44 16 36.4% 
    City/Town 54 25 46.3% 55 20 36.4% 
    Schoolb 21 6 28.6% 14 4 28.6% 
Total 160 68 42.5% 171 55 32.2% 
 
Level of Gov’t Test of  Differencec 
 p > χ 2 
State 0.739 
Local  0.078 
    County 0.070 
    City/Town 0.292 
    Schoolb 0.703 
Total 0.052 
 
a This figure displays the governing body challenged. Where suits challenged multi-
ple governments, the highest level is counted.  
b The chi-square value for this level of government is Yates continuity-corrected.  
Source: Ellen D. Katz & The Voting Rights Initiative, www.votingreport.org (2006). 
c Chi-square values for each level of government analyze contingency tables for cov-
ered/noncovered jurisdictions versus successful/ unsuccessful results. 
 
218 Ellen Katz 
  
Table 8.4. Types of Electoral Practices Challenged under Section 2, 
1982–2005a 
 
At-Large Elections  
Jurisdiction Total % of Suits Success % Success 
Covered 77 47.8% 39 50.6% 
Noncovered 69 40.6% 28 40.6% 
     
Total 146 44.1% 67 45.9% 
Chi-square = 1.486; p > χ 2 = 0.223 
  
 Reapportionment Plans 
Jurisdiction Total % of Suits Success % Success 
Covered 49 30.4% 27 55.1% 
Noncovered 62 36.5% 19 30.6% 
     
Total 111 33.5% 46 41.4% 
Chi-square = 6.746; p > χ 2 = 0.009 
 
 Majority-Vote Requirements 
Jurisdiction Total % of Suits Success % Success 
Covered 10 6.2% 5 50.0% 
Noncovered 3 1.8% 1 33.3% 
     
Total 13 3.9% 6 46.2% 
Chi-square = 0.023b; p > χ 2 = 0.879 
  
a Note that some lawsuits included a challenge to more than one practice simultane-
ously. Chi-square values for each electoral practice analyze contingency tables for cov-
ered/noncovered jurisdictions versus successful/unsuccessful results.   
b The chi-square value reported for this electoral practice is Yates continuity-
corrected. 
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Table 8.4. cont. 
 
 Election Admin. Procedures 
Jurisdiction Total % of Suits Success % Success 
Covered 20 12.4% 5 25.0% 
Noncovered 21 12.4% 9 42.9% 
     
Total 41 12.4% 14 34.1% 
Chi-square = 1.453; p > χ 2 = 0.228 
 
Otherc 
Jurisdiction Total % of Suits Success % Success 
Covered 17 10.6% 0 0.0% 
Noncovered 22 12.9% 0 0.0% 
     
Total 39 11.8% 0 0.0% 
Chi-square = N/Ad. 
      
c Other practices include: felon disfranchisement statutes, annexations, appointment 
procedures. 
d No chi-square value is reported for this factor. 
Source: Ellen D. Katz & The Voting Rights Initiative, www.votingreport.org (2006).  
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Table 8.5. Level of White Bloc Voting in Elections Documented in 
Section 2 Litigation 1982–2005a 
  
Covered Jurisdictions 
Whites Voting 
as a Bloc 
Number of 
Elections % of Elections 
90-100% 106 52.5% 
80-89% 57 28.2% 
80% WBV or higher: 80.7% 
70-79% 22 10.9% 
70% WBV or higher: 91.6% 
60-69% 13 6.4% 
50-59% 4 2.0% 
Total Elections 202 100.0% 
  
 
Noncovered jurisdictions 
Whites Voting 
as a Bloc 
Number of 
Elections % of Elections 
90-100% 46 17.9% 
80-89% 59 23.0% 
80% WBV or higher: 40.9% 
70-79% 58 22.6% 
70% WBV or higher: 63.4% 
60-69% 61 23.7% 
50-59% 33 12.8% 
Total Elections 257 100.0% 
 
a Election data for this figure was collected from 105 lawsuits that found legally sig-
nificant racially polarized voting. Some courts provided no election data with their find-
ing. Elections showing 50% or less white bloc voting were rarely discussed by courts (six 
elections in covered, and five in noncovered), and so were not included here.  
The chi-square value analyzing the contingency table with covered/noncovered ju-
risdictions versus 80% WBV or higher/79% WBV or lower categories is 73.876 (df = 1, 
p = 2.2*10^(-16)). 
Source: Ellen D. Katz & The Voting Rights Initiative, www.votingreport.org (2006). 
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Table 8.6. Changes v. Longstanding Electoral Practices Challenged 
Under Section 2, 1982–2005a 
 
  Covered Jurisdictions 
Type of Challenge Total % Suits Success % Success 
Longstanding/  
Implementation 86 53.8% 35 40.7% 
     
Reapportionment 49 30.6% 27 55.1% 
Other Change 25 15.6% 7 28.0% 
Total Changes 74 46.3% 34 45.9% 
     
Total 160 100.0% 69 43.1% 
 
  Noncovered Jurisdictions  
Type of Challenge Total % Suits Success % Success 
Longstanding/  
Implementation 79 46.2% 24 30.4% 
     
Reapportionment 62 36.3% 19 30.6% 
Other Change 30 17.5% 11 36.7% 
Total Changes 92 53.8% 30 32.6% 
     
Total 171 100.0% 54 31.6% 
 
 Test of Difference 
Type of Challenge p > χ 2 
Longstanding / Implementation 0.167 
  
Reapportionment 0.009 
Other Change 0.495 
Total Changes 0.079 
  
Total 0.030 
 
a This Figure compares the total number and success rate of suits challenging long-
standing practices (including implementation), with the same for newly enacted practices. 
All challenges where the date of enactment is unclear are included in the old category. 
Source: Ellen D. Katz & The Voting Rights Initiative, www.votingreport.org 
(2006).
 
 
 
 
